Mean field games formalize dynamic games with a continuum of players and explicit interaction, where the players can have heterogeneous states. As they additionally yield approximate equilibria of corresponding N -player games, they are of great interest for socio-economic applications. However, the techniques used for mean field games crucially rely on assumptions that imply that for each population distribution the individual agent has a unique optimal response. For finite action spaces, this will only hold for trivial models. Thus, the techniques used so far are not applicable. We propose a model with finite state and action space, where the dynamics are given by a time-inhomogeneous Markov chain that might depend on the current population distribution. We show existence of stationary mean field equilibria under mild assumptions and propose techniques to compute all these equilibria. More precisely, our results allow -given that the generators are irreducible -to characterize the set of stationary mean field equilibria as the set of all fixed points of a map completely characterized by the transition rates and rewards for deterministic strategies. Additionally, we propose several partial results for the case of non-irreducible generators and we demonstrate the presented techniques on two examples.
Introduction
Mean field games have been introduced independently by Lasry and Lions (2007) and Huang et al. (2006) in order to provide a framework for dynamic stochastic games in continuous time with a continuum of players, whose equilibria furthermore serve as approximate Nash equilibria for corresponding N -player games. The main feature of these games is that any player does not observe the state and action of each other player individually, but only at an aggregated level through the empirical distribution of these characteristics.
From an economic perspective these games are of particular interest as they yield a formal way to describe games with a continuum of rational players that accounts for explicit interaction (in contrast to the classical assumption in general equilibrium theory that "prices mediate all social interaction" ) as well as heterogeneity of states (in contrast to representative agent models (see Gomes et al. (2015, p.209) )). Therefore a wide range of economic models relying on mean field games emerged, which includes growth models, the production of an exhaustible resource by a continuum of producers as well as opinion dynamics (see Gomes et al. (2015) , , Caines et al. (2017) and the references therein).
In classical mean field games models each individual player's dynamics X is given by a diffusion process whose drift and volatility depend on time, the current state and the current action of the individual player as well as the current distribution of all players. Each player individually solves an optimal control problem given these dynamics, where the costs also depend on the current state and action of the individual player as well as distribution of all players. A mean field equilibrium is then given by a flow of population distributions m such that there is an optimal strategy π for the individual control problem given m and the distribution of the individual player given this strategy is in turn m. This is a natural analogue of a Nash equilibrium of games with N players: Given that all players play the strategy π, no player wants to deviate from playing π, as the population distribution is m and π is a best response to it.
To solve this type of mean field games one then sets up several assumptions, which always ensure that given a fixed flow of population distribution there exists a unique optimal response. Then one can show that finding a mean field equilibrium boils down to solving a system of a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation coupled with a FokkerPlanck-equation -or if one prefers the probabilistic approach -to a Forward-Backward Stochastic Differential Equation (FBSDE). The forward-backward structure of these differential equations is non-standard and a wide range of the literature regarding mean field games covers the analysis of these equations. For more details consider Bensoussan et al. (2013) and Carmona and Delarue (2018a,b) as well as the references therein.
Finite state mean field games have been introduced in Gomes et al. (2010) in discrete time and in Gomes et al. (2013) in continuous time in a way that the techniques used for diffusion-based models can be readopted. More precisely, the individual dynamics are now driven by a continuous time Markov chain with fully controllable transition rates and the costs can again depend on the current state and action of the individual player as well as the current distribution of all players. As in the diffusion-based models assumptions are set up which imply that given a fixed population distribution there is always a unique optimal response (which in equilibrium will be continuous). Again, a forward-backward system now consisting of ordinary differential equations now yields mean field equilibria. Thereafter several other models often with more general dynamics have been introduced; we give an overview over the existing models in the end of the introduction.
In applications often models with finite state and finite action space are considered, which is reasonable to assume as players often have the choice among finitely many options: Kolokoltsov and Malafeyev (2017) set up a model of corruption with two actions (to stay in one's state or to change it). Kolokoltsov and Bensoussan (2016) analyse the use of botnet defence by computer owners with a mean field game model with four states and the two actions to defend ones computer or to leave it unprotected. Guéant (2009a) considers a two state model of the labour market, where each player can decide to work in one of the two sectors. Besancenot and Dogguy (2015) consider a similar model on paradigm shift in science, where each player can decide in which of the two paradigms he wants to work in.
In all these applications there are population distributions for which there is no unique optimal response, but instead several strategies are optimal simultaneously. Thus, these examples do not fit into the standard mean field game theory considered so far. This is not a specific feature of these particular examples, but we will show in this paper, that for any mean field game with finite state and finite action space in our framework, either two actions are optimal simultaneously for some population distribution, or the game is trivial in the sense that irrespective of the population distribution always the same action is optimal. In the examples presented before all authors develop their own tools to solve their particular model: Kolokoltsov and Bensoussan (2016) and Kolokoltsov and Malafeyev (2017) only analyse stationary equilibria in deterministic strategies, Guéant (2009a) and Besancenot and Dogguy (2015) set up a dynamics equation only after analysing optimal decisions given a certain population distribution. They then also focus on stationary equilibria, as well as the dynamic behaviour close to these stationary equilibria and the effect of shocks.
In this paper, we will present general tools to compute stationary equilibria of mean field games with finite state and action space: We introduce the notion of stationary mean field equilibria into the mean field game model with finite state and finite action space presented in Doncel et al. (2016a) . Since the analytic formulation of Doncel et al. (2016a) is not suitable for this task, we formulate the model in a probabilistic way: The individual dynamics of a player is given by a time-inhomogeneous continuous time Markov chain with the generator depending on the current action and the current distribution of the population; the costs depend on the current state as well as the current action of the individual player and the current population distribution. As in Doncel et al. (2016a) in the case of dynamic equilibria, we introduce randomization to ensure the existence of stationary equilibria.
We focus on stationary equilibria for several reasons: First, searching for stationary equilibria reduces the complexity of the considered problem. More precisely, we can utilize the standard theory on Markov decision process with stationary transition rates and rewards and we can considered a fixed point problem in R S instead of a fixed point problem in some function space. Second, the main focus of the economic models studied so far also lies in stationary equilibria. Third and linked to the last reason, one can often establish some kind of convergence/adjustment process towards stationary equilibria. Gomes et al. (2013) prove that under certain assumptions every dynamic mean field equilibrium converges to the stationary equilibrium and Guéant (2009b) describes a cognitive process that converges if it is started close to stationary equilibrium indeed to the stationary equilibrium. Also in the examples presented by Guéant (2009a) and Besancenot and Dogguy (2015) it is shown that there is local convergence of the trajectories of the dynamic equilibrium to the stationary equilibrium.
Relying on our probabilistic formulation of the model, we will show existence of stationary equilibria under the same conditions as in the dynamic case. This is compared to Gomes et al. (2013) a surprising result as they need several additional assumptions compared to the dynamic existence result to establish existence of stationary equilibria. However, in contrast to Gomes et al. (2013) our proof is non-constructive and does not yield any insights regarding properties of the equilibria.
The probabilistic formulation is also a major building block when we derive the tools to compute all stationary equilibria (including those where the equilibrium strategy randomizes over different actions). As in standard mean field game models we first have to solve an optimal control problem given a fixed flow of population distribution and second a fixed point problem, namely searching for flows of population distributions m such that m is the distribution of an individual player playing optimal given m.
We will see that the first problem is equivalent to solving a standard Markov decision process with expected discounted reward criterion and we will show that the set of all randomized optimal policies is the convex hull of all deterministic optimal policies. For general dynamics, we cannot simplify the fixed point problem directly but we will provide a generally applicable reformulation of the necessary and sufficient balance equations inspired by the cut criterion for standard Markov chains, which often proves helpful in examples. Assuming irreducibility of the generators of the individual dynamics given any population distribution and any strategy, we can obtain all dynamics given stationary equilibria as the fixed points of a set-valued map with convex values, which can be completely characterized by the transition rates and rewards given deterministic strategies.
Related Literature
As indicated previously we would like to sketch briefly the research regarding finite state mean field games: The starting point regarding the study of finite state mean field games were the models of Gomes et al. (2010) (in discrete time), Gomes et al. (2013) and Guéant (2011 Guéant ( , 2015 . We will focus on the continuous time models here: In both models, fully controllable transition rates are considered (Guéant (2011 (Guéant ( , 2015 additionally assumes that the players might not reach all other states from a given state) such that the player's dynamics is given by a time-inhomogeneous Markov chain. The costs consist of instantaneous costs depending on the current state and action of the individual player as well as the current distribution of all players together with a terminal cost depending on the current state of the individual player and the current distribution of all players. In both models, assumptions are set up such that there is always a unique optimal response given a fixed population distribution. For both models then a system of forward-backward ODEs is presented, which solutions yield a mean field equilibrium. Moreover, existence and uniqueness of solutions to these equations is discussed.
Guéant (2011) discusses further sufficient conditions for the existence of mean field equilibria (including a discrete state master equation); Gomes et al. (2013) studies stationary equilibria and establishes for contractive mean field games that a trend to equilibrium exists. Gomes et al. (2013) furthermore study an N -player game and the convergence of this game to the mean field game model. Additionally, as in the diffusion-based models, the class of potential mean field games is introduced, which has a simpler cost structure and thus allows for deeper results. Namely, the costs split in two additive terms, one term depending on the current state and the current population distribution, as well as one term depending on the current state and current action, which is furthermore the gradient of a convex function. Note that the setup of Gomes et al. (2013) could be used to describe the restrictions regarding transition rates in Guéant (2015) (Carmona and Delarue, 2018a, Chapter 7) .
Several other authors discuss similar questions in models with more general individual's dynamics, in particular the transition rates might not be fully controllable, but again assumptions were set which imply that there is a unique optimal response given a fixed population distribution: Carmona and Delarue (2018a, Chapter 7 .2) provide a discussion of finite state mean field games, which is closely related to their exposition of standard mean field games models with continuous state space. They consider models in which transition rates depend on the current state, the current action and the population distribution and discuss existence and uniqueness results as well as a master equation. Basna et al. (2014) discusses mean field games were the dynamics are given by a non-linear Markov process with a generator that might additionally depend on the distribution of all other players and show under several assumptions that mean field equilibria are 1 N -Nash equilibria for the corresponding N -player games. Cecchin and Fischer (2018) present a mean field game with the individual dynamics given by stochastic differential equation driven by a stationary Poisson random measure, where again a dependence on the current population distribution is possible. They discuss existence and uniqueness of mean field equilibria and furthermore show that mean field equilibria in open-loop and feedback strategies are N -Nash equilibria for the corresponding N -player game. Carmona and Wang (2018) provide a mean field game model with the dynamics given by a continuous time Markov chain with a generator which might depend on the current distributions of the states as well as the actions of all players. Using the semimartingale representation of continuous time Markov chains they again consider existence, uniqueness and the question when a mean field equilibrium is an approximate Nash equilibrium for the corresponding N -player game.
The model of Doncel et al. (2016a) (which we consider in this paper) does not require a unique optimal response given a fixed population distribution, but instead it is directly assumed that the action space is finite. The dynamics of each individual player are given by a differential equation specifying the transition rates, which in turn depend on the individual's state and action as well as on the current population distribution. Existence of dynamic mean field equilibria is shown and a discrete time N -player game is considered, for which it is shown that mean field equilibria are -Nash equilibria. Furthermore, the question of convergence is considered. More precisely, given a sequence of strategies (π N ) which are equilibria in the N -player game is there some sub-sequence converging to a mean field equilibrium? The answer to this question is positive if one considers local strategies (which only depend on the current state and time), but negative if one considers Markov strategies (which also depend on the current distribution of all players). The intuitive reason for this is that the "tit-for-tat"-principle cannot be applied in the limit (see Doncel et al. (2016b) for more details).
Organization of the Paper
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 introduces the model in a probabilistic formulation. In Section 3 we show that for all models fitting into our framework at least one stationary mean field equilibrium exists. Section 4 discusses the individual control problem. Section 5 first discusses the generally applicable cut criterion for our setting, then -given irreducibility of the generator -we propose a characterization of the set of all dynamics given mean field equilibria as the set of all fixed points of a suitable set-valued map which is completely determined by the dynamics and rewards given the deterministic strategies. Section 6 concludes the paper by showing how the presented tools can be applied to find stationary mean field equilibria in two examples.
The Model
Let S = {1, . . . , S} (S > 1) be the set of possible states of each player and let A = {1, . . . , A} be the set of possible actions. With P(S) we denote the probability simplex over S and similarly for P(A). A (mixed) strategy is a measurable function π : S × [0, ∞) → P(A), (i, t) → (π ia (t)) a∈A with the interpretation that π ia (t) is the probability that at time t and in state i the player chooses action a. We say that a strategy π = d : S × [0, ∞) → P(A) is deterministic if it satisfies for all t ≥ 0 and for all i ∈ S that there is an a ∈ A such that d ia (t) = 1 and d ia = 0 for all a ∈ A \ {a}. Throughout the presentation we often use the following equivalent representation, which is to represent a deterministic strategy as a function d :
with the interpretation that d i (t) = a states that at time t in state i action a is chosen. With Π we denote the set of all (mixed) strategies and with D the set of all deterministic strategies.
The individual dynamics of each player given a flow of population distributions m : [0, ∞) → P(S) and a strategy π : S × [0, ∞) → P(A) are given as a Markov process X π (m) with given initial distribution x 0 whose infinitesimal generator is given by the
where for all a ∈ A and m ∈ P(S) the matrices (Q ··a (m)) are conservative generators, that is Q ija (m) ≥ 0 for all i, j ∈ S with i = j and j∈S Q ija (m) = 0 for all i ∈ S.
The goal of each player is to maximize his expected reward, which is given by
where x i (t) is the probability that the individual player is in state i at time t, r : S ×A×P(S) → R is a real-valued function and β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. That is, for a fixed population distribution m : [0, ∞) → P(S) we face a Markov decision process with expected discounted reward criterion and time-inhomogeneous reward functions and transition rates.
We will work under the following mild continuity assumption, which will ensure, that there is indeed a Markov process with generator Q π (see Guo and Hernández-Lerma (2009, Appendix B+C) 
for details):
Assumption A1. For all i, j ∈ S and all a ∈ A the function m → Q ija (m) mapping from P(S) to R is Lipschitz-continuous in m . For all i ∈ S and all a ∈ A the function m → r i,a (m) mapping from P(S) to R is continuous in m.
With these preparations, we can introduce the concept of dynamic mean field equilibria:
Definition 2.1. Given an initial distribution m 0 a mean field equilibrium is a flow of population distributions m : [0, ∞) → P(S) with m(0) = m 0 and a strategy π :
• the distribution of the process X π (m) at time t is given by m(t)
As in standard game theory, our concept of mean field equilibrium captures the intuitive idea that no player wants to deviate: Given that all players play according to strategy π the population's distribution will be m. If an individual player now evaluates whether he wants to deviate from playing π he asks whether there is a strategy, that yields a higher payoff given m, due to the first condition this is not possible. Therefore we indeed face an equilibrium in the standard economic sense.
Remark 2.1. Using the Kolmogorov forward equation (Guo and Hernández-Lerma, 2009 , Proposition C.4) we see that the first condition implies the analytic condition used in Doncel et al. (2016a) to characterize mean field equilibria, which states that m is solution ofṁ
In order to define stationary mean field equilibria, we first introduce the notion of stationary strategies: A stationary strategy is a map π : S × [0, ∞) → P(A) such that π ia (t) = π ia for all t ≥ 0. Again we denote by Π s the set of all stationary strategies and by D s the set of all deterministic stationary strategies.
Definition 2.2. A stationary mean field equilibrium is given by a stationary strategy π and a vector m ∈ P(S) such that
• the law of X π (m) at any point in time t is given by m
This notion is a sensible formalization of stationary equilibria: Given the strategy π the population's distribution will be m for all time points. As we will see in Section 4 the strategy π will be optimal for an individual agent for any initial distribution, thus he has no incentive to deviate from the equilibrium strategy π, which means that the population will indeed remain in the stationary equilibrium regime of playing π.
Remark 2.2. Note that the first condition is now equivalent to
and that the second condition requires π to optimal among all strategies, not only those that are stationary.
Remark 2.3. In contrast to the standard models where the assumptions always imply that a unique optimal best response exists, the mean field equilibria we consider are not fully specified by the distribution, as it might happen that several actions are simultaneously optimal and induce the same distribution. However, the dynamic mean field equilibrium is fully specified by describing the equilibrium strategy, as one can show using standard techniques (Walter, 1998, Theorem 12.VII) that there is at most one solution to the differential equation. For the stationary mean field equilibrium, this again does not hold true, as it might happen that given a strategy there are multiple stationary distributions. For this reason, we define mean field equilibria always as pairs of the equilibrium distribution and the equilibrium strategy.
Existence
In Section 4 we will show that Assumption A1 implies the following condition:
Using this, we will prove that whenever the general assumption A1 holds there exists a stationary mean field equilibrium. We will adapted the ideas presented in Doncel et al. (2016a) to prove this. More precisely, we will show the existence of a fixed point of an associated best response map in the dynamics. This map maps to each point m all the stationary points of Q π (m) given that π is an optimal strategy for m. In contrast to the proof of the existence of dynamic equilibria presented in Doncel et al. (2016a) we do not only rely on standard calculus arguments, but instead the proof crucially relies on our probabilistic representation of the problem.
Formally, we say that given m, x ∈ P(S) a stationary strategy π is feasible for (x, m)
and define
The best response map is now defined by φ : P(S) → 2 P(S) with
We will now show using Kakutami's fixed point theorem that this map has a fixed point and that each fixed point of this map induces a stationary mean field equilibrium:
Theorem 3.1. Given the general assumption A1 there is a stationary mean field equilibrium.
Proof. The proof relies on the application of Kakutami's fixed point theorem (Border, 1985, Corollary 15.3) . After a preliminary observation, we check whether φ satisfies the conditions of the theorem, that is we verify that φ(x) is non-empty and convex and that φ has a closed graph. Afterwards we argue, that any fixed point of φ yields a stationary mean field equilibrium.
We start with a preliminary observation: The set of tuples (m,
Next we note that for any m ∈ P(S) the set φ(m) is non-empty: Condition (2) ensures that there is an optimal strategy π. Furthermore, by the standard theory for continuous time Markov chains there is a stationary distribution x for the Markov chain with generator Q π (m). Since the set of all (m , x , π ) satisfying (3) is compact, also the set of all (x , π ) such that (m, x , π ) satisfies (3) is compact and the set of all π such that (m, x, π ) satisfies (3) is compact. Thus there is a strategy π such that the maximum in Y (x, m) is achieved. Similarly we find an x which achieves the maximum in φ(m), thus φ(m) is non-empty and we find for all x ∈ φ(m) indeed a strategy π for which a value of Y (x, m) is achieved.
For each m ∈ P(S) the set φ(m) is convex as replacing x i π ia by z ia yields the optimization problem
where z satisfies the following constraints
This problem is linear in z, thus if x 1 and x 2 together with π 1 and π 2 are optimal in the original problem, then z 1 and z 2 are optimal in the modified problem. Let now
is also optimal for the modified problem and thus x 3 together with some π 3 is also optimal for the original problem.
Finally it remains to verify that φ has a closed graph, that is that for any sequence (m n ) n∈N ∈ P(S) N and x n ∈ φ(m n ) for all n ∈ N with lim n→∞ m n = m and lim n→∞ x n = x we indeed have x ∈ φ(m).
Since x
n ∈ φ(m n ) there exists a strategy π n such that (m n , x n , π n ) satisfies the individual stationary dynamics and (x n , π n ) achieve the minimal value given m n under the constraint to satisfy (3). Using the preliminary observation that the set of all feasible tuples is compact we obtain a converging subsequence (m n k , x n k , π n k ) whose limit is (m,x, π) and which automatically satisfies the dynamics. As we are considering the product space of Hausdorff spaces it is immediate thatm = m andx = x. We now have to show that π is indeed a maximizing strategy given (m, x) and that x is indeed a maximizer of Y (·, m).
To prove the first part we assume that the statement is false, that is we find a strategỹ π that achieves a higher value than the strategy π and satisfies the individual stationary dynamics. Now by simple convergence results we obtain that
However, since x n k was a maximum of Y (·, m n k ) with strategy π n k , for all sufficiently large k the individual stationary dynamics cannot be satisfied for all (x, m n k ,π). By a similar argument to the preliminary observation we can now conclude that (x, m,π) does not satisfy the dynamics, which is a contradiction.
In order to prove the second part we again assume that x is not maximizing Y (·, m), but instead there is a maximizerx and a strategyπ, with which the maximum is achieved. Now we obtain xQ(m
Since x n k is a maximizer of Y (·, m n k ) this leads to the conclusion, that (x, m n k ,π) does not satisfy the individual stationary dynamics. This again implies that also (x, m,π) does no satisfy the individual stationary dynamics, which is a contradiction, thus our initial assumption is wrong and we proved that x ∈ φ(m). Now Kakutami's fixed point theorem (Border, 1985, Corollary 15. 3) yields a fixed point m ∈ φ(m). Then by construction (m, m, π) satisfies (3), that is m is a stationary point of the dynamics given Q π (m) and as π maximizes Y (m, m) the strategy π is indeed an optimal strategy given m.
The Individual Control Problem
This section is devoted to the analysis of the individual control problem: On the one hand, we propose a simple approach to determine which strategies are optimal for a given population distribution, on the other hand, we verify that the condition (2) indeed holds true whenever Assumption A1 is satisfied.
We start by showing that given a stationary population distribution m ∈ P(S) the individual player's control problem is equivalent to a continuous time Markov decision process with expected discounted reward criterion (see Guo and Hernández-Lerma (2009) for a definition and general results).
Lemma 4.1. Let m ∈ P(S) be a population distribution and x 0 be any distribution for the initial state of the individual player. A Markovian randomized strategy π is optimal in our model given m, i.e. achieves the maximum value of V (π , m) among all strategies π ∈ Π, if and only if it is discounted reward optimal for the CTMDP with transition rates Q ija (m), rewards r ia (m) and discount factor β.
Proof. Assumption A1 ensures that the value function is finite for every population distribution function and every individual strategy, as c(·) is, as a continuous function on a compact space, uniformly bounded. Thus we can rewrite the value function by applying Fubini's theorem as well as the representation
where
is the expected discounted reward of a CTMDP with expected discounted reward criterion with the above-mentioned rates and rewards, when the initial state is k. Since a strategy π is optimal for the CTMDP if it maximizes all V π k (m) simultaneously we directly obtain the desired equivalence. Now, we show that the set of all optimal stationary strategies is the convex hull of all deterministic optimal stationary strategies. Note that this in particular implies that a stationary strategy is optimal for some initial distribution if and only if it is optimal for all possible initial distributions.
Then D(m) is non-empty. Furthermore, a stationary strategy is optimal for our model given m if and only if it is a convex combination of strategies from D(m).
Proof. By the previous lemma we know that the individual's control problem is equivalent to the continuous time Markov decision process with expected discounted reward criterion with discount factor β, transition rates Q ija (m) and reward function r ia (m). Since we consider a finite state space, we obtain a a discrete time Markov decision process with expected discounted reward criterion through uniformization (Guo and Hernández-Lerma (2009, Remark 6.1) , Kakumanu (1977) ). The discount factor is α = ||Q(m)|| β+||Q(m)|| and with ||Q(m)|| = sup i∈S,a∈A −Q iia (m), we obtain the transition rates
and the reward functionsr
Simple computations yield that
withṼ * j (m) being the value function of the discrete time Markov decision process, which is indeed equal to the value function of the continuous time Markov decision process (see Kakumanu (1977) for details; note however, he does not adjust the rewards, which yields the proportional factor for the value functions in his setting). Now we can prove the statement for discrete time Markov decision processes relying on the rich theory developed for these problems (see Puterman (1994) ): We first note that the set D(m) in non-empty since A is finite and that by Puterman (1994, Corollary 6.2.8) 
Noting thatr π andP π are linear in π, we can rewrite the policy evaluation equation as
Since for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} the policy d i is optimal it follows that V π = V * is the unique solution of the policy evaluation equation:
By Puterman (1994, Theorem 6.2.2 and Theorem 6.2.5), which states that in our setting the unique solution of the optimality equation is V * , and by Puterman (1994, Theorem 6.2.6), which states that a policy is optimal if and only if its value function is a solution of the optimality equation, we directly see that the policy π is optimal.
To show the converse implication we assume that π is not a convex combination of deterministic strategies from D(m). One easily sees that there is still a representation of π as a convex combination of arbitrary deterministic strategies by considering
Moreover, any convex combination of deterministic strategies representing the strategy π has a summand d / ∈ D(m) with positive weight. This means that for the strategy d
there is a state i ∈ S and an actionã ∈ A \ O i (m) such that d(i) =ã. This implies that also the policy π chooses that actionã in state i with positive probability, that is π iã > 0. This means for the i-th component of the policy value:
Note that the second lines follows from V π ≤ V * and the third line follows from the fact thatã / ∈ O i is chosen with positive probability π iã .
As now V π (i) < V * (i) and by the finiteness of S and A an optimal policy achieving value V * exists, it is directly obvious that π is not optimal.
Note that by this theorem condition (2) always holds whenever A1 holds and furthermore, we reduced the problem of determining which of the infinitely many strategies indeed are optimal for a given m ∈ P(S) to the problem of determining which of the finitely many deterministic strategies are optimal.
This theorem yields a basic guideline for finding all mean field equilibria: Partition the set P(S) into finitely many sets Opt(A 1 × . . . × A S ), which consist of all those m ∈ P(S) for which O i (m) = A i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , S} holds. In these sets, we then have to search for fixed points of the dynamics given all those strategies being convex combinations of elements in D(m).
Furthermore, the results allows us to prove the claim presented in the introduction that all non-trivial finite state models for which two different strategies exists that are optimal for some population distribution, we have a population distribution m for which at least two actions are optimal. By the classical theory of Markov decision processes we know that those deterministic strategies are optimal that maximize the expected discounted reward V d (m). Noting that the expected discounted reward is given by
and that r d (·) and Q d (·) are continuous it directly follows that also V d (·) is continuous. The set of all those points where a certain strategy d is optimal is the preimage of [0, ∞)
and thus closed. Whenever there are two strategies that are optimal for some population distribution d we have two (or more) non-empty closed sets. Thus, since P(S) is itself closed and connected, there will be a population distribution m for which at least two actions are optimal.
The Fixed Point Problem

The Cut Criterion
To solve the fixed point problem we have to determine the solutions of m T Q π (m) = 0 for all strategies π that are optimal for some population distribution and then one has to check whether π is indeed optimal for these solutions. In many settings this task is not simple (see Section 6.2). However, often a cut criterion similar to the one used for Markov chains is useful, although it is just a reformulation of the balance equation m T Q π (m) = 0 (see Kelly (1979, Lemma 1.4 ) for a description of the criterion for standard continuous time Markov chains). The criterion states that if we partition the state space of the Markov chain into two sets, then the probability flow from one set to the other has to equal the probability flow from this other set to the first.
The particular use of the criterion is that in most models that have been consider so far there has always been a set of states for which the dynamics to and from this set cannot be influenced by the player by choosing any particular strategy. This means that any mean field equilibrium irrespective of the chosen strategy has to satisfy certain equations coming from the cut criterion, which could be obtained from the standard balance equations Q π (m)m = 0 only by sensible rearrangements. In Section 6.2 we will show that the criterion indeed simplifies the search for fixed points. Summing this identity over all j ∈ T yields j∈T i∈S
Subtracting the identity j∈T i∈T
yields the desired result.
Mean Field Equilibria are Fixed Points of a Specific Map
This section is devoted to proving that there is an explicit characterization of φ(m), which has been introduced in Section 3, in terms of the deterministic maps x d (·) for those strategies d that are optimal for m. In order to show this we will need irreducibility of Q π (m) for all strategies π ∈ Π s . Note that it is sufficient to verify irreducibility for all deterministic strategies d ∈ D s , since any stationary strategy π is a convex combination of deterministic strategies and thus
The main consequence of Q π (m) being irreducible is that there is a unique stationary distribution of the continuous time Markov chain (CTMC) with generator Q π (m) (see Durrett (1999, Corollary I.4 .6 and Theorem I.4.7), Norris (1997, Theorem 3.5.1)), this observation allows us to formulate the main theorem, which we will prove in the rest of the section:
The proof of this theorem basically relies on the idea to characterize the stationary distribution x π (m) of the CTMC with irreducible generator Q π (m) by a closed form expression and then showing that x π (m) is a convex combination of (x d (m)) d∈D s . In order to follow this programme we have to prove several properties of the generator matrix Q starting with the following lemma regarding the structural properties of an irreducible, conservative generator Q ∈ R S×S , more precisely regarding the minor Q SS , which arises from Q by deleting the last row and column:
Lemma 5.3. Let Q ∈ R S×S be an irreducible, conservative generator of a CTMC with state space S. Then all eigenvalues of the minor Q SS have negative real part. Consequently Q SS has full rank and
The technical proof can be found in the appendix, it basically consists of the following arguments: We first note that −Q SS is a matrix with non-negative off-diagonal entries and thus fits in the framework of Berman and Plemmons (1979, Chapter 6) . For matrices fitting in this framework fifty criteria equivalent to the statement A is a non-singular M -matrix are proposed. We then describe a method to find a vector x ≥ 0 such that I 28 , which states that there exists an x with x i > 0 for at least one i ∈ S \ {S} such that −Q SS x > 0 (where the inequality signs hold pointwise), is satisfied. From this we can conclude that G 20 is satisfied, which states that the real part of each eigenvalue of −Q SS is positive, which in turn yields the claim.
Noting the last column is the negative sum of all other columns and reminding ourselves that the previous lemma states that the S − 1-minor Q SS has full rank we obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 5.4. Let Q ∈ R S×S be an irreducible, conservative generator of a CTMC with state space S. Then the rank of Q is S − 1.
With these two results, we can now explicitly characterize the stationary distribution given a stationary strategy π and a population distribution m:
Lemma 5.5. Let π be a stationary strategy, m ∈ P(S) such that Q π (m) is irreducible. LetQ π (m) be the transpose (Q π (m)) T where the last row is replaced by (1, . . . , 1). Then we have that the unique stationary distribution x π (m) is given by
Furthermore, we can write
Proof. The stationary distribution of our process is uniquely determined by ( 
Since the last equation of the system 0 = x π (m) T Q π (m) is the negative sum of all other equations, we obtain that the system (5) is equivalent to
which by definition ofQ π is (0, . . . , 0, 1)
We now show that the rank of the matrixQ π (m) is S, as in this case we can invert the matrix. Similar to Resnick (1992, p.137-139) we rely on the existence of the stationary distribution given Q π (m):
In order to show thatQ(m) has full rank we show thatQ T (m)x = 0 implies that x = 0. First let π be a stationary distribution given Q(m), then we have by definition that πQ T (m) = (0, . . . , 0, 1). Thus
As x S = 0 we have
However, we know that the kernel of Q is span(1, . . . , 1) T , which implies that x = 0.
The last part of the statement simply follows from Cramer's rule together with the Laplace expansion of the Laplace expansion of det(Q π (m)) along the last line
and the observation that
T only in the S-th row.
In order to establish the desired result on characterizing the convex set φ(m) solely in terms of transition rates and rewards for deterministic strategies, one final preparation has to be made: We have to to show that the determinant ofQ π (m) has uniform sign over all π ∈ Π s : For this write d (a 1 ,...,a S ) for the deterministic strategy satisfying d(i) = a i . Then it holds thatQ
Now a simple application of the intermediate value theorem yields the desired result:
Lemma 5.6. Let m ∈ P(S) be a population distribution such that
Proof. We note that the map π →Q π (m), which ranges from Π s to R S×S is continuous. Since the determinant is also a continuous function we see that π → det(Q π (m)) is a continuous function. By Lemma 5.5 we have that det(Q π (m)) = 0 for all π ∈ Π s . If there would be a strategy π 1 and a strategy π 2 such that det(Q π 1 (m)) < 0 and det(Q π 2 (m)) > 0, then by the intermediate value theorem, there would be a π ∈ Π s such that det(Q π (m)) = 0, which would be a contradiction.
With all these preparations, we can now prove the characterization result stated in the beginning of the section:
Proof of Theorem 5.2. For readability we suppress the dependence of Q and x on m.
is zero for all non-optimal strategies by Theorem 4.2. WithQ being the matrix Q T without the last row, we can now writeQ π as follows:
As the determinant is linear in columns and we have a i ∈A π ia i = 1 for all i ∈ S we obtain det(Q π ) =
Similarly, we obtain using that
This implies
So we see that x π is a linear combination of x d (a 1 ,...,a S ) for any stationary strategy π and furthermore the coefficients are given by
From (6) we obtain that
By Lemma 5.6 we note that the signs of the determinantsQ π andQ π are the same for any two strategies π, π . Thus, as π ia ≥ 0 for all i ∈ S, a ∈ A we obtain that λ k ≥ 0 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , S}. In total this yields that every point in φ(m) is a convex combination of
Thus determining optimal deterministic policies and then investigating the set valued map φ(m) = conv(x d 1 , . . . , x d k ) with x d i being the feasible point for d i with d 1 , . . . , d k being the optimal strategies for m is sufficient to find all mean field equilibria. Formally, we obtained:
Theorem 5.7. Assume that there is a set T ⊆ P(S) such that for all m ∈ T and all π ∈ Π s the matrix Q π (m) is irreducible. Then the set of all distributions lying in T induced by some stationary mean field equilibrium is given by
where Opt(A 1 × . . . A S ) is the subset of P(S) for which exactly the strategies
} are optimal and F P (f ) is the set of all fixed points of the correspondence f .
In case of constant dynamics, that is Q ija (m) = Q ija for all m ∈ P(S) the second step of this programme is simple, since the maps
T and this implies that the unique fixed point isQ −1 · (0, . . . , 0, 1) T . Thus, we can characterize the set of all mean field equilibria as explicitly by only computing the optimality sets and the stationary points given Q d as follows:
Corollary 5.8. Let the dynamics be constant, that is Q ija (m) = Q ija for all m ∈ P(S), and let the generators Q d given any strategy d be irreducible. Then the set of all distributions induced by some stationary MFE is given by
Examples
This section presents two mean field game models, which have been considered in similar versions in the literature before, and illustrates the application of the techniques presented before. In general solving examples means to solve the two previously described problems: First, we have to solve an optimal control problem given a fixed population distribution and then we have to solve the related fixed point problem(s). Whereas the first problem can be tackled relying on standard recipes, the second problem is more complex to solve. In general, one considers each optimality set individually and tries to find candidates/eliminate candidates relying on the approaches presented before.
A Consumer Choice Model
The model we present now is a model with constant dynamics that is the dynamics do not depend on the current population distribution. The context and utility function are similar to a model introduced by Gomes et al. (2014) as a toy example on which the authors demonstrated numerical methods for a specific class of finite state mean field game models, namely those yielding systems of hyperbolic partial differential equations. Note however, that the action spaces and choice options of the players differ systematically.
The model is inspired by consumer choices in the mobile phone sector. The utility of using a certain provider is increasing in the share of customers using it, whereas the costs are constant. We assume that the utility coming from the other customers in service is given by the isoelastic utility function ln(m i ) + s i , with s i ∈ R. Note that since ln(m i ) is always negative for our choice of m i , one cannot interpret s i as costs directly, but one rather has to think of s i consisting of two components: the costs themselves and some base utility from service provision. The players can now choose in our model whether to stick to their provider i or whether to switch to the other provider, in this case the player additionally faces a time-unit switching cost c i ≥ 0. Note that for technical reasons it is important that the player always faces a small risk of going to the other provider also he does not want to go there (one could think of this risk as the possibility of another family member changing the provider although one does not want to).
These choice options substantially differ from the model in Gomes et al. (2014) , where the players could continuously control the rates at which they switch to the other state and were facing costs corresponding to the square of the rate. From an applied point of view, it is not reasonable, that players indeed understand their control options (as standard economic experiments show that most people cannot understand the true effect of random devices even in simple settings) and that such a precise control is impossible to put into practise even if players understand it.
The formal description of the model is now given by
where 0 < < b and s 1 , s 2 , c > 0.
In order to analyse the model we first solve the optimality equations
which directly yield that it is optimal to change in state 1 if and only if
and that it is optimal to change in state 2 if and only if
. Thus, we know that choosing to change in both states is never optimal. Therefore we focus on the three potentially optimal strategies {change} × {stay}, {stay} × {stay} and {stay} × {change}. The expected discounted reward given these strategies is
.
In order to understand which strategy is optimal, we compute the differences
and analogously we obtain
As a next step we compute the fixed points given the three strategies {change} × {stay}, {stay} × {stay} and {stay} × {change}, noting that we never need to consider the fixed point given {change} × {change}, as it is never optimal to randomize in both states. Since we face standard continuous time Markov chains, this task is simple and we obtain for each strategy a unique fixed point:
We note that depending on the choice of parameters we have between one and five equilibria: For simplicity we write
note that we always have
We can now obtain the exact number and position of equilibria by coefficient comparison. The strategies that are used in mixed strategy equilibria are then obtained by solving the balance equation m T Q π (m) = 0 with m being the population distribution of the mixed strategy equilibrium. We will omit this last step, which is basically the task of solving a system of linear equations.
, then x {stay}×{change} together with the deterministic strategy {stay} × {change} is the unique stationary mean field equilibrium.
• If d 1 < b+ and
, then x {stay}×{stay} together with the deterministic strategy {stay}×{stay} and x {stay}×{change} together with the deterministic strategy {stay}×{change} are the deterministic equilibria. Furthermore, there is one mixed strategy equilibrium with m 1 = d 1 that randomizes over {stay} and {change} in the second state.
• If d 1 < b+ and b b+ < d 2 , then the only equilibrium is given by x {stay}×{stay} together with the deterministic strategy {stay} × {stay}.
•
, then x {stay}×{change} together with the deterministic strategy {stay} × {change} and x {change}×{stay} together with the deterministic strategy {change} × {stay} are the deterministic equilibria. Furthermore, there is a mixed strategy equilibrium at the point with m 1 = d 1 that randomizes over {stay} and {change} in the first state.
, then x {stay}×{change} together with the deterministic strategy {stay} × {change}, x {stay}×{stay} together with the deterministic strategy {stay} × {stay} and x {change}×s together with the deterministic strategy {change}×{stay} are the deterministic equilibria. Furthermore, there is one mixed strategy equilibrium with m 1 = d 1 that randomizes over {stay} and {change} in the first state and one mixed strategy equilibrium with m 1 = d 2 that randomizes over {stay} and {change} in the second state.
{stay}×{stay} together with the deterministic strategy {stay}×{stay} and x {change}×{stay} together with the deterministic strategy {change}×{stay} are the deterministic equilibria. Furthermore, there is one mixed strategy equilibrium with m 1 = d 1 that randomizes over {stay} and {change} in the first state.
• If , then x {stay}×{change} together with the deterministic strategy {stay} × {change} and x {change}×{stay} together with the deterministic strategy {change} × {stay} are the deterministic equilibria. Furthermore, there is a mixed strategy equilibrium at the point with m 1 = d 2 that randomizes over {stay} and {change} in the second state.
• If {change}×{stay} together with the deterministic strategy {change} × {stay} is the unique stationary mean field equilibrium.
A Simplified Corruption Model
We now consider a simplified version of the corruption model presented in Kolokoltsov and Malafeyev (2017) : In their model a player can be in one of the three states honest (H), corrupt (C) and reserved (R). The corrupt players get a higher wage than the honest players, which in turn get a higher wage than the reserved players that have been convicted to be corrupt. For simplicity we set w C = 10, w H = 5 and w R = 0 and exclude the fine for being convicted which is an additional feature in their model. The players can choose given that they are not reserved, whether they want to stay corrupt/honest or whether they want to switch behaviour. In this case they become honest/corrupt with the rate b. A player that is reserved is recovered with a fixed rate r and we assume that he will then be honest. Additionally the model captures "social pressure" in two ways: First, the more players are corrupt the higher is the pressure (one cannot escape) to also become corrupt. Second, the more players are honest, the higher is the rate to become convicted to be corrupt. In the model of Kolokoltsov and Malafeyev (2017) there is also a principal agent that convicts players, for simplicity we decided to ignore this feature of the model as well.
C:10P
H:5P R:0P The formal characterization is given by A = {change, stay} together with
and c change = c stay = (10, 5, 0) T , where all parameters b, q inf , q soc and r are strictly positive. A visualization of this model is given in Figure 1 .
We start with computing the value function for given m ∈ P(S) as the unique solution of
We directly see that one should choose to change in state 1 if V 1 (m) ≤ V 2 (m) and to stay in state 1 if V 1 (m) ≥ V 2 (m) and one should chose to change in state 2 if V 1 (m) ≥ V 2 (m) and to stay in state 2 if V 2 (m) ≥ V 1 (m). A straightforward calculation yields that the optimality sets are given by
Opt({stay, change} × {stay, change}) = m ∈ P(S) : m H = r + β q soc .
Note however, that depending on the choice of parameters the quantity r+β qsoc is greater than one, exactly one or less than one. In the first case only Opt({stay} × {change}) is non-empty, in the second case Opt({stay} × {change}) and Opt({stay, change} × {stay, change}) are non-empty and in the third case all optimality sets are non-empty.
As a second step we use the cut criterion from Theorem 5.1 for the set T = {R}, which yields the equation q soc m H m C = rm R for all stationary strategies. Together with the equation 1 = m R + m H + m C we obtain
Furthermore we obtain that the sum of m C and m H is always less than one, thus any mean field equilibrium is uniquely characterized by describing m C . More precisely, any stationary mean field equilibrium has a distribution point of the form
It now remains to consider the fixed point problems given the possible optimal strategies: We start by noting that stationary points of the dynamics given {stay}×{change} exists whenever (7) and
is satisfied, which is true if m H = 0 or m C = b/(q soc − q inf ). Thus whenever these points lie in Opt({stay} × {change}) or Opt({stay, change} × {stay,change}) we have a deterministic mean field equilibrium given the strategy {stay} × {change}.
Similarly, stationary points of the dynamics given {change} × {stay} have to satisfy (7) and
which is true if either m C = 0 or m H = b/(q inf − q soc ). Thus whenever these points lie in Opt({change} × {stay}) or Opt({stay, change} × {stay,change}) we have a deterministic mean field equilibrium given the strategy {change} × {stay}.
When searching for stationary points given the dynamics of mixed strategies, which might be equilibria,we can restrict to those that lie inside Opt({stay, change}×{stay,change}). In this set all equilibria have to satisfy m H = r+β qsoc
, that is r + β q soc = 1 − m C qsoc r m C + 1 ⇔ m C = r(q soc − r − β) (2r + β)q soc .
It remains to check whether there is a strategy such that the point r(q soc − r − β) (2r + β)q soc , r + β q soc , (r + β)(q soc − r − β) (2r + β)q soc is indeed a fixed point for the individual dynamics equation given strategy π, which means that we have to find constants π 1,change and π 2,change that satisfy for this point (−π 1,change b − q soc m H )m C + π 2,change bm H + q inf m C m H = 0, which is parameter-dependent.
As in the previous example, we would now need to perform a case analysis to obtain the exact set of mean field equilibria for all possible equilibrium constellations. Additionally, we would need to solve the balance equations m T Q(m) = 0 for π for any m that is a candidates for randomized equilibria. Both tasks are simple, but tedious and we omit them here.
A. Appendix
Proof of Lemma 5.3. As we face a conservative generator we see by definition that Q ij ≥ 0 for all i = j and that j∈S Q ij = 0, thus all off-diagonal entries of Q are non-negative and that the row sum is always zero. Furthermore, by requiring irreducibility we do not have a row of zeros, thus the diagonal entries are strictly negative.
The matrix Q SS again has non-negative off-diagonal entries, strictly negative diagonal entries and row sum is less or equal zero. Furthermore the irreducibility of Q implies that Q iS is non-zero for at least one i ∈ {1, . . . , S − 1} and thus the row sum for at least one i is strictly negative. We now show that I 28 is satisfied. 
From which one directly sees that (Q SS x) k is increasing in x k and decreasing in x l since Q kl > 0 for all l = k.
Define for all x ∈ ([0, ∞)) S−1 the set T (x) = {k ∈ {1, . . . , S − 1} : (Q SS x) k > 0} as the set of all indices where the i-th component of Q SS x is greater than zero. We will now define inductively an sequence x n ∈ R S a sequence of vectors such that for some m ∈ N we have T (x m ) = {1, . . . , S − 1}. We will start with the vector x 0 with a one at every component and construct x n in such a way that T (x n ) T (x n−1 ) for all n ∈ N and moreover x n i > 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , S − 1} and all n ∈ N 0 .
Starting with x 0 being the vector of ones directly implies that T (x 0 ) = ∅, as we have previously seen that the row sum, which is (Q SS x 0 ) i is positive for some index i ∈ {1, . . . , S − 1}.
In the n-th step (n ∈ N) we check whether T (x n−1 ) = {1, . . . , S − 1}. If this is the case we have shown that I 28 indeed holds, else there is an index j ∈ {1, . . . , S 1 } \ T (x n−1 ). In this case let i ∈ T (x n−1 ). Since our CTMC is irreducible the underlying transition graph is strongly connected, which implies that there is a path from j to i. Letk be the first node on this path that lies in T (x n−1 ) and let k be its predecessor. Note that by definition of the transition graph Q kk > 0. Now let x n be as follows x It is obvious that x n l > 0 for all l ∈ {1, . . . , S − 1}. It remains to check whether m ∈ T (x n−1 ) implies m ∈ T (x n ) and to show that k ∈ T (x n ), as this proves that T (x n−1 ) T (x n ).
As Q SS (x n )k > 0 by construction it is obvious thatk ∈ T (x n ). For m =k we see again as (Q SS x) m is decreasing in xk and x Thus if m ∈ T (x n−1 ), then m ∈ T (x n ).
For m = k we have a strict inequality as (x . Thus (Q SS x n ) k > (Q SS x n−1 ) k = 0, which directly implies k ∈ T (x n ), thus T (x n ) T (x n−1 ).
Thus I 28 is satisfied and as −Q SS lies in Z n×n we can conclude that it is a non-singular M -matrix and furthermore that G 20 holds which implies that all eigenvalues of our matrix have positive real part. Therefore all eigenvalues of Q SS have negative real part.
As the matrix Q SS is real, all complex eigenvalues appear in pairs of complex conjugates. As the product of a complex number and its complex conjugate is non-negative we obtain that the determinant which can be computed as the product of all eigenvalues is as claimed since only the number of real eigenvalues or more specifically the parity of this number matters for the sign of the determinant. As the parity of the number of real eigenvalues always equals the parity of S − 1 we conclude that the sign pattern of the determinant is as claimed.
